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INTRODUCTION
Standard, or first-generation, rent control places a ceiling on the rents th landlord can charge. Hence, under standard rent control excess demand housing is common.
Arguably, more common than standard rent control is 'tenancy rent contro which allows a landlord to set the rent freely when leasing to a new tena (subject to, of course, the tenant's right not to accept), but prevents the landlo from raising the rent, or evicting the tenant.' It will be shown in this paper tha through the workings of the market, tenancy rent control can result in outcome which looks as if there is standard rent control. That is, in equilibrium may be in the landlord's interest to keep the rent for new tenants so low that th is excess demand for housing at that rent. The landlord voluntarily behaves as there were a legal ceiling on the rental rate. This surprising result has analogies the theory of efficiency wage (Leibenstein 1957; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) or t theory of efficiency interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) .
It should be clarified here that our model is one where there is tenancy ren control and landlords have monopolistic power. In fact, what we are considerin here is the case of a monopolist landlord-which is the other polar extreme to t case modelled in Basu and Emerson (2000) . We do not claim that this case is any way closer to the reality of housing markets than the perfect competition assumption. The reality is surely somewhere in between the two models. We do believe that it is essential to understand both polar cases so that we can bet comprehend the reality of modern rent control systems. The standard result o monopoly (with fixed supply), where price is raised above the market-clearing le and some of the product (housing, in this case) remains unsold (vacant), arises i our model. Of course, a monopolist with a fixed supply may not sell all of its go this is also standard and arises in our model as well. But what is surprising is tha under certain parametric conditions, we can have the opposite case, where landlord sets the rent so low as to give rise to excess demand for housing.
The assumption of perfectly competitive or monopolistically competit housing suppliers is a common one in the theoretical literature on rent control fixed by a rent control authority or government (see Olsen 1998 for a discuss of the different forms of rent control), or of a law that gives landlords some or freedom to adjust rents when leasing out property to new tenants but t requiring the rent to be held constant (or adjusted upward only within limits long as a tenant remains the lessee (and with the landlord having no ri arbitrarily to evict a sitting tenant). This latter form of rent control, ca 'tenancy rent control' (see, e.g. Basu and Emerson 2000; Nagy 1997; Arnott 199 B6rsch-Supan 1986), is quite pervasive and is the subject matter of this paper. Given tenancy rent control, the presence of even a small positive inflation gives rise to an adverse selection problem. Landlords now prefer short-sta tenants to long-staying tenants (as long-stayers impose greater cost landlords because of the erosion of real rents during a single tenancy), but th have no way of telling the types apart.2 Long-staying tenants know their typ but have no interest in revealing this information to prospective landlor Curiously, the relation between rent control and inflation remains a negle subject. We tried to develop the building blocks of a model for analysing this Basu and Emerson (2000) .
In the present paper we develop some of the basic theory in a continuo time model and build into our model some elements of reality-to wit, lim supply and monopolistic power on the part of landlords-that have not be modelled thus far.3 Each (potential) tenant has an exogenously given duration of tenure t When we say that a tenant is of 'type t' we mean that he will move from apartment after t periods. There is a continuum of tenants, and their den function on the tenure duration, t, is given by f(t), with F(t) being corresponding distribution function. All agents are supposed to have the s discount rate 6 E [0, 1).
We denote the total number of tenants in the rental market by N. He
Suppose a landlord leases out to tenants only of type t (that is, gets a ty tenant after every t periods), and each time a new tenant comes he fixes the so that its real value is $1. Thereafter the nominal value of the rent remains fixed so long as the tenant does not leave. Let the inflation rate be such that the value of each dollar erodes in each period at the rate of I -3, where / E (0, 1). Under these circumstances, the present value of the landlord's real income is denoted by v(t). Clearly, then, The process of adverse se tenants of a certain type market. This is due to the worthwhile to rent in this erosion of real rents as do process, see Step 1 of the pr mathematically.) Hence the central mathem expected present value of manages to rent out his hou with tenure time x > t, at a thereafter is kept fixed nom time a tenant leaves the lan the following expression:
To understand this, observe that f(x)/(N -F(t)) is the probability of picking a type x tenant, conditional on tenants of type t and above being available. The expression in the square bracket is the present value of rents earned when the first tenant is of type x. Now we are ready to state and prove the one technical result on which we will build our economic analysis. Proposition 1. If t" > t', then Di(t") < i'(t').
Proof: See Appendix.
With this technical result in the background, it is now easy to describe a full model of rent control. When tenants make the decision of whether to lease a rent-controlled apartment, the alternatives they have to keep in mind are for them to find housing in a non-rent-controlled area or to buy a house. Let us assume that an alternative housing arrangement costs C dollars (in presentvalue terms). For simplicity, we assume that C is independent of the tenant's 'type'. This seems reasonable as well. In buying a house the cost will clearly be independent of whether the person is a long-stayer or a short-stayer. Similarly, in renting an apartment in a non-rent-controlled area, the tenant's type is unlikely to matter because the rent can be inflation-indexed or made contingent on the length of the tenant's stay. Now suppose that the rent (per period) in the rent-controlled housing is R.
The lifetime rental cost to a tenant of type t is clearly given by Rv(t). Recall that v(t) is the present value of lifetime payment made by a tenant of type t if the real rent at the start of tenure is set each time at 1.
Consider now a monopoly landlord, who sets the real (starting) rent equal to R. Clearly, only those type t tenants for whom Rv(t) C will accept this. Since from Step 1 of Proposition 1, we know that v'(t)< 0 for all t, it follows that all type t tenants for whom t > v-'(C/R) will accept the offer. from the definition of (.-) that the landlord's expected present value of rental earned from each apartment that is leased out is given by V(R) -RO(v-'(C/R)).
From
Step 1 of Proposition 1, we know that as R rises, v-'(C/R) rises. Hence, from Proposition 1 we know that as R rises O(v-'(C/R)) falls. It is now transparent that as R rises, V(R) may rise or fall. Figure 1 represents a possible picture of V(R).
Define i to be the supremum of the set {t If(t)> 0}. In other words, and more informally, i is the upper support of f(t). So, i is such that there are no tenants of type t > i, and for all t > 0, there exists tenants of type t E [t"-t, t].
Now define R such that v-1 (C/R) = i. Then if rent goes above R, there are no further takers among the tenants. Hence V(R) is not defined for R > R. At R, the only takers are of type i. Hence V(R) = Rv(t1) = Rv(i) = RC/I = C. It is easy to see that, for all R < 1, V(R) < V(R). This explains the shape of V(R) in Figure 1 .
It is also evident that V(R) can fall over some stretches. This is especially transparent if tenant types are finite. Then, over some increases in R, large numbers of short-stayers can decline the rental offer, leaving the pool of tenants suddenly worse from the landlord's point of view. This is the classic adverse selection problem (Akerlof 1970) .
II. EXCESS SUPPLY, EXCESS DEMAND AND EFFICIENCY RENT
The results are the outcome of the landlord's optimization problem when confronted with an earnings curve, V(R). The case of many landlords who drive profits down to zero was analysed in Basu and Emerson (2000) . Here we take on the other polar end: the case of limited supply and monopoly. Rent control applied to a fixed stock of housing, such as in New York, and the I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I   I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I To locate the landlord's optimum rent, consider all rents less than R, and locate the rent (left of R) that maximizes V(R). This, in Figure 2 , is given by R*. Since V(R) is not necessarily monotonic, there is no reason why R* will coincide with R.
Observe that, if the landlord were restricted to selecting a rent less than or equal to R, she would choose R*. This is because, for all R < R, she manages to lease out the same number of apartments, to wit, S, and at R* the perapartment earnings are maximized. Hence the total earnings are maximized at R*.
Next, consider rents greater than or equal to R. As R is raised starting from R, the earnings of the landlord must eventually (weakly) rise (since V(R) = C > V(R), for all R). However, even if V(R) rises, the total earnings need not rise, since demand falls below S and so more and more apartments remain vacant as R is raised. Let R" be the rent where total earnings are maximized (subject to R > R).
Let E be the same height as A, and R' the projection of E on the horizontal axis. The landlord's chosen rent will clearly be either R* or R". If R" E [R, R'), clearly, her earnings are greater at R*, since at such an R", per-apartment earning is smaller and fewer apartments are taken. Even if R" > R', total earnings may be smaller at R", since at such a rent the landlord may be unable to find tenants for all her apartments.
If the optimum turns out to be at R", then this is a fairly typical monopoly equilibrium. The monopolist holds back supply in order to push up the price and her earnings. The interesting case occurs when R* turns out to be the optimum. Here demand for housing exceeds supply (see lower panel of Figure 2 ). Nevertheless, the landlord prefers not to raise the rent. This is because a higher rent worsens the 'quality' (from the landlord's point of view) of the tenant. This is rather like in models of efficiency wage (e.g. Stiglitz 1974; Mirrlees 1975) or efficiency interest rates (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) . We shall therefore call R* the efficiency rent.
Usually, we would expect this kind of a rent to prevail on the market if rent control took the form of an exogenous ceiling on rent. In such a case demand exceeding supply is compatible with equilibrium. What our model illustrates is that, even if there is no ceiling on rents, tenancy rent control can result in behaviour such that the market equilibrium mimics a rent ceiling.
It is interesting to note that the R* equilibrium is the more likely outcome as S increases. This is because, as S increases, at R" the landlord's profit is unchanged, since at R" the number of tenants is constrained by the demand (remember at this point there is excess supply of housing), and so an increase in supply does nothing to the landlord's income. On the other hand, at R*, the landlord's profit is given by V(R*) multiplied by S (see Figure 2 ). So an equilibrium with excess demand for housing is more likely when a large portion of the rental stock is under rent control.
III. CONCLUSION
Well meaning urban policy-makers of the 1970s and 1980s, attempting the glaring problems of old-style rent controls that placed ceilings To prove Proposition 1, first note that i(t) can be simplified, using (1 : f(x)(1 -e-6x)v(x)dx (A1) i(t) = N -F(t) -Jf (x)e -6xdx From (Al), it is clear that -(t) is the weighted average of the different values of ranges from t to oc. This is obvious from the fact that, if v(x) is removed (i.e. i to 1, for all x) from the right-hand side of (Al), then the right-hand term equ
The proposition is now proved in three steps.
Step 1. We will show that v(t) rises as t falls. In other words, v'(t) <0, for all t. this, note that v(t) = ( e -pxe -6xdx +( e -Xe -e6xdx e-t ( e -xe-Sxdx (e -6t)2 ..
1 -e -P + 6) (T + 6)(1 -e -6').
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